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In 1982, the landmark US Supreme Court 
ruling in Plyler v. Doe granted undocumented 
immigrant students access to free public school-
ing. The ruling, however, did not address 
postsecondary education. Federal laws have 
prevented undocumented students from receiv-
ing financial benefits to attend college, creating 
financial and legal barriers between students and 
the American dream.1
Over the past decade, there have been sev-
eral unsuccessful attempts to pass the contro-
versial DREAM Act (Development, Relief, and 
Education for Alien Minors). The Act would 
provide conditional permanent residency to 
undocumented youths who graduate from US 
high schools after having arrived in the United 
States as minors, and having lived in the country 
continuously for at least five years prior to the 
bill’s enactment. Proponents argue that the mea-
sure would alleviate the inequalities experienced 
by students whose parents brought them to the 
United States as young children; opponents 
claim that it would pave the way for a future 
blanket amnesty. On June 15, 2012, the Obama 
administration announced a policy directive 
to grant deferred action to a certain group of 
undocumented immigrants. While the directive 
is similar in scope to DREAM Act proposals, it 
is neither a legislative act nor an executive order. 
1 Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 forbids 
undocumented students from receiving federal aid for post-
secondary education. 
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There are an estimated 4.4  million undocu-
mented immigrants under age 30 in the United 
States and of these, an estimated 1.7 million (39 
percent) would be eligible for deferred action 
under the policy directive (Passel and Lopez 
2012).
To date, more than ten states have enacted 
laws that qualify undocumented students for 
in-state tuition fees rather than the higher fees 
nonresidents pay.2 While the number of states 
to have passed such laws is growing, only a 
handful of studies have analyzed the effects of 
these state policies on the educational attain-
ment of undocumented immigrant youth (Kaushal 2008; Flores 2010; and Chin and 
Juhn 2010). Kaushal (2008) finds that allow-
ing undocumented students access to in-state 
tuition increases college enrollment within that 
group by 2.5 percentage points—an increase of 
more than 30 percent over a base mean of 8 
percent.
This paper contributes to the existing lit-
erature examining the effect of legal status on 
the educational access of immigrant youth in 
the United States. Specifically, I use a differ-
ence-in-differences framework to analyze the 
effect of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act (IRCA) of 1986, which granted amnesty 
to undocumented immigrants who entered 
the United States before January 1, 1982 and 
resided there continuously. So far, most studies 
on the effects of IRCA have provided thorough 
analyses of the law’s effect on labor market 
outcomes among adult immigrants who ben-
efited from the amnesty program. All these 
studies have found positive effects of IRCA on 
earnings (see, for example,  Rivera-Batiz 1999; 
2 These states include CA, CT, IL, KS, MA, MD, NE, 
NM, NY, OK, TX, UT, and WA. Wisconsin enacted a similar 
law in 2009 but then revoked that law in 2011. 
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Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Amuedo-
Dorantes, Bansak, and Raphael 2007; Amuedo-
Dorantes and Bansak 2011; and Pan 2012). 
Yet none has analyzed IRCA’s effect on the 
educational attainment of the immigrant chil-
dren to whom it gave amnesty. With the IRCA 
children having now come of age, the present 
study assesses the effect of this large amnesty 
program on their access to post secondary 
education.
The analysis here has two advantages over 
the previous studies. First, although the earlier 
research exploits state-time variation in the 
passage of the state laws to estimate effects 
on college enrollment of Hispanic immigrant 
youth, these studies may suffer from legislative 
endogeneity. States that adopted such legisla-
tive policies may be vastly different from those 
that did not. The identification strategy I apply 
here exploits instead a national reform. Second, 
the previous studies consider only Hispanic 
immigrant youth. While this subgroup of immi-
grants clearly is important to analyze, I assess 
an overall impact of IRCA on all immigrant 
youth and provide estimates for immigrant 
subgroups. My main finding shows that immi-
grant youth who were granted amnesty under 
IRCA are more likely to enroll in postsecond-
ary education.
I. Empirical Strategy and Data
This paper uses a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to analyze the effect of legal 
status granted under IRCA on the educational 
access of previously undocumented immigrant 
youths in the United States. In this setup, the 
first difference compares changes in college 
enrollment rates before and after the enactment 
of IRCA. The second difference is between two 
immigrant youth groups: a control group who 
always has permanent legal status (refugees) 
and a treatment group with undocumented sta-
tus (economic immigrants). The central assump-
tion of this identification strategy is that no other 
exogenous factors could explain the differences 
observed in this time frame.
I follow the methodology outlined in Cortes (2004), which distinguishes refugees from eco-
nomic immigrants. Using several volumes from 
the Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (1970–1996), Cortes 
(2004) sorts refugees entering the United States 
by nation of origin, then closely matches those 
refugees with US census data, using the vari-
ables year of immigration and detailed country 
of birth.3,4
The following model specification is esti-
mated by OLS to analyze the effect of IRCA on 
postsecondary educational access of immigrant 
youths:
(1)  Yit = α +      ∑ 
k=1975, k≠1982
 
1986
 β k · I ( Yea r t = k ) 
 + γ · Trea t it econ + δ · IRC Ai · Trea t it econ 
 +  X
it
 · ϕ + φ +  ε
it
 ,
where Yit is a binary variable that indicates col-
lege enrollment for immigrant youth i in cohort 
t (i.e., year of immigration). I(·) is an indica-
tor function associated with immigrant arrival 
cohort in year t. Trea t it econ is a binary variable that 
is equal to one if the observation is an economic 
immigrant youth or zero if the observation is a 
refugee immigrant youth. IRCAi is a binary vari-
able that indicates if immigrant youth i arrived 
in the United States during the amnesty years. 
That is, IRCAi is equal to one if immigrant youth 
i is observed in arrival cohorts 1975–1981 (i.e., 
amnesty granting period); or equal to zero if 
immigrant youth i is observed in arrival cohorts 
1982–1986 (i.e., no amnesty granting period). 
Xit is a vector of demographic characteristics 
that include gender, race/ethnicity, household 
family size of the immigrant youth, family size 
squared, and school-level age of arrival indica-
tor variables (preschool: ages 0–4; elementary 
school: ages 5–10; middle school: ages 11–13; 
and high school: ages 14–18). φ is a vector of 
fixed effects. Two sets of fixed effects are used to 
capture unobserved effects of state of residence 
3 In her paper, Cortes reports on a detailed set of statis-
tical comparisons of these two groups, in terms of age of 
arrival, gender, and family composition. Based on her classi-
fication developed using the US Census, statistically signifi-
cant differences in the characteristics between refugee and 
economic immigrant groups are found. 
4 During the period of 1975–1986, INS classified 
immigrants from the following countries as refugees: 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, 
Iran, Laos, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, 
and Vietnam. 
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and place of birth.  εit is a normally distributed 
random error term.
The coefficients of the above DID framework 
have the following interpretation:  βk captures 
the yearly cohort differences, in the average 
outcome over time, that are common to both 
economic and refugee youth groups; γ captures 
the average permanent differences between the 
groups. Last, and of particular interest, is the 
coefficient δ, which is the DID estimator that 
captures the effect of IRCA. This parameter 
measures the difference in college enrollment 
before and after IRCA for economic immigrant 
youths, compared to the corresponding differ-
ence for refugee immigrant youths.
The data used in this analysis come from the 
5 percent Public Use Sample of the 2000 US 
decennial census. The analytical sample consists 
of 33,866 foreign-born immigrant youths who 
were not older than 18 years of age upon arrival 
in the United States, and who immigrated to the 
United States between 1975 and 1986. I exam-
ine seven cohorts who were eligible for IRCA (i.e., immigrants who arrived between 1975 
and 1981), and five cohorts who were ineligible 
for IRCA since they missed the cut-off year of 
immigration (i.e., those who arrived between 
1982 and 1986).
Figure 1 presents the 2000 US census dif-
ferential trends in postsecondary enrollment 
among economic and refugee immigrant youth. 
Each line graphs the mean of college enrollment, 
conditional on year of immigration for both 
immigrant groups. The figure shows that for 
economic and refugee youth arriving in the US 
between 1975 and 1981, the 2000 college enroll-
ment rates of the two groups track each other 
very closely. In contrast, we see a divergence of 
these two rates for immigrant youth who arrived 
after 1981. Figure 1 illustrates the point that eco-
nomic youths who missed the amnesty period 
are less likely to enroll in college than economic 
youths who arrived within the amnesty period.
II. Empirical Findings and Discussion
The results for the regression-adjusted DID 
analysis are reported in Table 1. This table 
reports only the estimated coefficients on the 
IRCA indicator variable (i.e., immigrant cohorts 
who entered the United States before 1982) 
interacted with the treatment indicator variable (i.e., economic immigrants) and the treatment 
indicator. All regression standard errors are 
robust and clustered on state and place of birth 
interactions. As Table 1 shows, there is a posi-
tive and statistically significant DID estimate for 
all model specifications. Though the magnitude 
of these point estimates varies slightly, the direc-
tion of the estimates is not sensitive to the addi-
tion of age at arrival and demographic controls (column 2) and it is fairly robust to the addition 
of the different sets of fixed effects (columns 3 
and 4). The point estimate on the DID estima-
tor ranges between 0.14 and 0.16. The preferred 
model specification is shown in column 4, which 
includes the full set of covariates and fixed 
effects and improves the efficiency of the DID 
estimator. Controlling for demographic charac-
teristics and state-by-place of birth fixed effects, 
I find that economic immigrant youth who were 
granted legal status under IRCA are 13.9 per-
centage points more likely to enroll in college.
In an additional analysis (results not shown), 
I estimated alternative DID estimators for differ-
ent policy windows. One concern might be that 
refugee youths who entered the United States 
during the years 1975-1981 may be differ-
ent from those who entered during 1982-1986. 
To assess the potential compositional change 
in the control group, I analyzed one, two, and 
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Figure 1. Percent Enrolled in College in 2000 by 
Immigrant Group and Year of Immigration
Notes: Immigrants who arrived in the US from 1975 to 1981 
were granted amnesty under IRCA. Immigrants who arrived 
after 1981 missed the cutoff year for the amnesty eligibility 
under IRCA.
Source:  2000 Census Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS), 
author’s own tabulations.
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three years on either side of the policy window. 
Looking at smaller time periods is a way to 
gauge the sensitivity of the previous DID esti-
mators. These alternative DID estimators are 
very comparable to the previous ones reported 
in Table 1. I find that at one year on either side of 
the policy window, college enrollment increased 
by 15.8 percentage points for economic immi-
grant youth who were given legal status under 
IRCA.
It is well documented that the majority of 
immigrants who were granted legal status under 
Table 1—Difference-In-Differences Regressions, the Effect of the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act (IRCA) on College Enrollment 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IRCA × treatment 0.155*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.139***
 (0.027)    (0.025)  (0.027)  (0.028)
Treatment (economic immigrant) −0.144*** −0.114*** −0.083*** −0.073***
 (0.034)    (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.017)
Constant 0.775*** 0.741*** 0.714*** 0.710***
 (0.018)    (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.023)
Immigrant cohort (year dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes
School level: age at arrival Yes Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes Yes
Place of birth fixed effects Yes
State-by-place of birth fixed effects Yes
Observations 33,866 33,866 33,866 33,866
R2 0.08 0.14 0.15 0.20
Notes: Sample consists of foreign-born individuals who arrived to the United States from 1975 
through 1986 and by age 18. Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) clustered at the 
state × place of birth. See text for list of control variables. Mean college enrollment rate is 0.55.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 2—Alternative Difference-in-Differences Regressions, the Effect of IRCA on 
College Enrollment by Specific Country of Origin
Latin America Southeast Asia
(1) (2) (1) (2)
IRCA × treatment 0.147*** 0.104*** 0.087** 0.091**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.042) (0.037)
Treatment (economic immigrant) −0.212*** −0.162*** 0.024 0.019
(0.024) (0.014) (0.044) (0.029)
Constant 0.715*** 0.662*** 0.733*** 0.647***
(0.024) (0.029) (0.019) (0.043)
Immigrant cohort (year dummies) Yes Yes Yes Yes
School level: age at arrival Yes Yes
Demographics Yes Yes
State fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 10,209 10,209 5,268 5,268
R2 0.14 0.19 0.05 0.08
Notes: Sample consists of foreign-born individuals who arrived to the United States from 1975 
through 1986 and by age 18. Robust standard errors (shown in parentheses) clustered at the state 
× place of birth. See text for list of control variables. Mean college enrollment rate for Latin 
America and Southeast Asia subgroups are 0.44 and 0.67, respectively.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
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IRCA predominantly came from Latin America: 
71 percent were from Mexico, 11 percent from 
Central America, and all other countries contrib-
uted the remaining 18 percent (Chiswick 1988). 
Table 2 reports DID results by two specific 
regions of origin: Latin America and Southeast 
Asia. The unadjusted DID estimates for the 
Latin America analysis are larger in magni-
tude than those for the Southeast Asia analysis: 
14.7 versus 8.7 percentage points, respectively. 
Conditioning on demographic characteristics 
and state fixed effects, I find that economic youth 
from Latin America and Southeast Asia who 
were granted legal status under IRCA are 10.4 
and 9.1 percentage points, respectively, more 
likely to enroll in postsecondary education.
III. Concluding Remarks
The results here show that immigrant youth 
are more likely to enroll in college when legal 
barriers are removed and financial barriers low-
ered. The point estimates are not strictly compa-
rable to those found in Kaushal (2008), Flores (2010), and Chin and Juhn (2010) since we are 
looking at two distinct time periods and poli-
cies. The previous studies analyzed laws passed 
in early and mid 2000s, which provided access 
to in-state tuition to undocumented students. 
This study, by contrast, considers immigrant 
youth who were given amnesty between 1975 
and 1981. Still, the estimated magnitudes of col-
lege enrollment among immigrant youth identi-
fied here are quite similar to those identified by 
Kaushal (2008). Using the preferred DID esti-
mate of 13.9 percentage points, for example, I 
find a 25 percent increase over the base college 
enrollment of 55 percent.
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